This paper deals with impacts of fossil fuel subsidy reform on economic growth, focusing mostly on the countries of the Middle East and East Africa (MENA) region. We first develop a theoretical growth model, and use it to demonstrate that a country can achieve higher levels of economic growth if the government reduces its energy subsidies. Our empirical work confirms the main results from the theoretical model. That is, a country that initially subsidizes its fossil fuels, and then eliminates or reduces these subsidies, will as a result experience higher economic GDP per capita growth, higher employment, and greater levels of labor force participation, especially among the youth. These effects are strongest in countries where fuel subsidies are generally high, such as those in the MENA Region. We here predict that for a given level of subsidy, a 20 cents average increase in the gasoline and diesel price per liter can increase the GDP per capita growth rate by about 0.46 percent and 0.24 percent, respectively. In the MENA countries, savings in subsidies seem to be earmarked by the region's governments to health expenditures, education expenditures and public investment in infrastructure. These channels appear to be strong contributing factors to higher long-run growth when fuel subsidies are reduced.
Introduction
Not much work has been done towards developing general equilibrium models in which both the removal of energy subsidies (and implementation of fuel taxes) and the investment of these subsidy savings by the government in productive public investment could i) create the appropriate environment to promote entrepreneurship and private investment; and ii) influence rates of economic growth. Neither has there been studies analyzing empirically how elimination of subsidies could foster economic growth, and the channels by which such growth could take place. The purpose of this paper is to fill up that gap. We aim to provide a partial characterization of when economies with efficient fuel taxation can be expected to grow faster than economies with high fuel subsidies. To achieve this goal, we develop and test empirically a model in which fuel subsidy savings (or collected taxes) can influence the allocation of resources (i.e. labor and reproducible capital) in ways that have implications for real rates of economic growth. We use a newly collected data set for the empirical work.
Why shall we worry about the consequences of having subsidies? Subsidies contribute to fiscal insolvency, resources are diverted from productive public investment, can lead to major distortions in the production and consumption structure of these economies, benefits mostly high income households which are usually a very small proportion of the population, and increase fuel consumption at suboptimal levels. The latter contributes to global warming and environmental pollution. Such attributes affect the overall long-run performance, particularly, economic growth.
Petroleum subsidies present major environmental and economic problems. Recent work by the International Monetary Fund (2013) indicates that on a "pre-tax" basis 1 , subsidies for petroleum products, electricity, natural gas, and coal reached $480 billion in 2011 (0.7 percent of global GDP or 2 percent of total government revenues). It further reports that the costs of subsidies are even higher among oil exporters, which account for about two-thirds of the total.
On a "post-tax" basis, subsidies are much higher at $1.9 trillion (2½ percent of global GDP or 8 percent of total government revenues. A prominent feature of energy markets in many countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is also the existence of energy subsidies, for a range of energy goods including motor fuels, electricity, and natural gas. Considering a 20-year period or longer, the level of subsidy has increased in many of these countries. The World Bank (2014) has indicated that even after reforms, energy subsidies in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen still account for more than 5 percent of their GDP. This number is even higher for Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, more than 10 percent of their GDP. Reforming energy prices in the MENA region, by letting energy consumers face prices close to their optimal levels, is likely to lead to measurable benefits for these countries.
Most analysis, both theoretical and empirical, of energy pricing reform to date has focused on fiscal and environmental/climate impacts of such reform (e.g. Perry and Small (2005)), and on the effect on household welfare (e.g. Gangopadhyay, Ramaswami and Wadhwa (2005) ; Arze del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012) ; Coady, Parry, Sears and Shang (2015) ). We here analyze how fuel taxation will affect economic growth.
Even though the issue of the relationship between economic growth and energy pricing, such as that for gasoline and diesel, is a very important economic policy topic today, hardly any work exists to shed light on such relationships. The existent empirical literature concentrates on the effects of energy prices or energy consumption on GDP, and not the effects of energy taxes or subsidies which are the focus here. This empirical work also uses statistical methods such as error-correction based panel co-integration techniques, and/or a panel autoregressive approach (e.g. Mehrara (2007) and Berk and Yetkiner (2013) ).
Our empirical work will focus on the countries of the MENA region, but part of the analysis will also consider other countries and World Bank regions, for comparison purposes but also to provide a robust analysis, covering the period 1998-2012.
Besides studying how the elimination of energy subsidies promotes economic growth in countries that implement enduring energy price reforms by reducing fuel subsidies, we also aim to shed light empirically on the following: i) whether reductions in fuel price subsidies ameliorate government budget deficits; ii) determining the economic channels by which a decrease in fuel price subsidies affect economic growth (e.g. are public subsidy expenditures redirected to increased spending on health, infrastructure, education, to subsequently affect growth?); and iii) how these relevant economic channels affect the relationship between energy subsidies and GPD per capita growth.
At least two important lessons can be drawn from our theoretical model. First, a reduction in fuel subsidies will trigger positive economic growth. Nonetheless, if existing fuel taxes are already set at too high levels that induce drastic declines in private savings (i.e. income after paying income and fuel taxes and energy expenses), this economy could experience a decline in growth. Thus, to achieve maximal economic growth, an economy cannot solely rely on public investment financed with tax revenues. It is also necessary to have sound and sustained private savings. Second, it is crucial that the government invests its reserves from fuel subsidy reductions or tax increases, in high-return long-run investment that helps to increase productivity capacity and give private agents the adequate incentives to engage in entrepreneurial activities.
From our empirical results we draw the following conclusions. First, using a cross-section approach which considers all the countries in the World Bank regions, we find that for a given level of average subsidy, a 20 cents average increase in the diesel and gasoline price has caused an average increase in the GDP per capita growth rate by about by about 0.28 percent and 0.46 percent, respectively. Second, with a panel approach for each of the World Bank regions, we find that in most regions, a decrease in fuel (diesel and gasoline) subsidies today leads to increased economic growth in the subsequent years. The exceptions are countries in the European and Central Asia (ECA) region which already have relative high fuel taxes. Countries like those in MENA, might need to cope with immediate reductions in their GDP per capita growth and employment (specially affecting the younger population) in response to more "correct" (higher) fuel price levels. However, as countries in the MENA region redirect subsidy expenditures toward more productive investments such as infrastructure and other public goods (i.e. health and education), they will in succeeding periods experience higher economic growth and employment. Third, our panel analysis in fact shows us that there is a significant positive effect of reducing fuel subsidies on employment and labor force participation especially among the young population, aged 15 to 25, and induces higher social and public investments by the government.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some stylized facts from the data.
Section 3 describes our theoretical model which analyzes how fuel subsidies affect economic growth. Section 4 contains the econometric modeling while Section 5 includes our empirical results. Section 6 reports the empirical analysis on how fuel subsidy savings of the countries in the MENA region are redirected toward health and infrastructure spending and serve as channels to promote employment and growth. We analyze in Section 7 how these channels affect the relationship between energy subsidies and GPD per capita growth. Section 8 concludes.
Data
The data set has been gathered by the Environment and Energy Team at the Development It is noticeable that a large number of MENA countries have had relatively higher price gaps or high average levels of diesel and gasoline subsidies than most ECA countries. The noticeable exceptions in ECA are Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, especially with respect to diesel. Moreover, the MENA countries not only have had, over the period of 1998 and 2012, higher levels of fuel subsidies, but also these subsidy levels have become larger over time. This can be seen in Figures (1a) and (1b) that the average change on their fuel price gaps have become more negative. This only means that MENA countries have made few attempts to improve their fuel pricing situation over these years. higher total pre-tax fossil-fuel energy subsidies (on petroleum, electricity, natural gas and coal) than public expenditures on health. The MENA countries will most likely benefit, in terms of higher productive public investment and economic growth, from reducing their fiscal costs due to energy subsidies. Del Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2012) and Manzoor, Shahmoradi, and Haqiqi (2012) in addition stress that in most MENA countries where fuel subsidies are very large, the economy is generally much more energy-intensive, and the increase in prices triggered by subsidy reform would have a bigger impact than in economies that have already adapted to the high oil prices.
Del Granado et al. (2012) also indicate that the removal of subsidies will eliminate price distortions, not only for fuels but also for final goods whose production depend on fuels. The overall allocation of resources would improve; many energy-intensive activities, with an artificial competitive advantage originated by subsidies, would be eliminated; and energy-saving investments would become more profitable.
3 How elimination of energy subsidies can contribute to economic growth: An analytical perspective
We study how elimination of energy subsidies (e.g. taxing energy consumption) promotes higher productivity capacity and raises rates of economic growth by considering an endogenous growth model (Paul Romer 1986 , 1990 ).
Our contribution consists in explaining how such entrepreneurial activity will be more encouraged in an environment where the government uses fuel taxes to invest in infrastructure and public goods in order to facilitate innovation, and higher productivity and profits in the private sector. A failure from the government to reduce energy subsidies, will leave this government with fewer resources to provide the necessary public services. This can result in a disproportionally large number of agents who would prefer to "overconsume" and retire early, and not become entrepreneurs. There will be then too many early retirees and fewer participants in the labor force which could cause the Social Security System to go bankrupt or become unfunded.
Agents should normally prefer to pay their taxes since the government is more suitable to make such public investments and take advantage of economies of scale. If agents instead selffinance their public investment projects, they face the risk of having to prematurely liquidate their investments to meet primary needs in the event of an income shock. This problem can be avoided by having a government that can maximize the welfare of the whole economy by collecting taxes and invest in public goods from which all agents can benefit.
Our theoretical model encompasses the following lines of reasoning for the government and private agent activities: i) the government collects income and fuel taxes from a large number of agents in the first period of their life when they work, and invests the tax revenues in infrastructure, R & D, public goods and producible capital in general 3 ; ii) in the second period of the agents' life, a certain proportion of them will prefer to consume from their net income right away, and retire early from the labor force claiming their pensions; others prefer to forego early consumption and become entrepreneurs and benefit from the government's infrastructure investments because these increase their productive capacity, and thereby promoting higher profits and economic growth; iii) the government, using the law of large numbers, make an assessment about how many will leave the labor force early (and receive pensions) and consume early; and how many will become entrepreneurs and contribute to increasing production and employment; iv) the government accordingly invests certain amount of the collected taxes in short-run investments in very liquid assets (e.g. in bank savings, mutual funds) to satisfy the demand of agents who retire early from the labor force, and the rest in long-term public investments; v) after paying taxes, individuals will have savings which they can invest and obtain a return if these investments are not withdrawn prematurely.
Main Assumptions
The economy consists of:
• A sequence of three-period-lived, overlapping generations. Each generation includes a continuum of agents. Time is indexed by t=0,1,2,…
• At each t, there is an equal number of young and old agents.
• All young generations are identical, which means that there is no population growth. Each young agent is endowed with a single unit of labor supplied inelastically. There are no labor endowments at ages 2 and 3.
• At t=0 there is an initial old generation, endowed with an initial per-firm working capital of k 0 units, and an initial "middle-aged" generation, which is endowed with an initial per-firm capital stock of k 1 units at t=1.
• Except for the initial old and middle-aged generations, agents have no endowment of capital (and consumption good) at any date. All working capital is owned by a subset of old agents, which are the entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs only use "their own" capital which together with the young generation of workers, produce a single consumption good. There is not capital rental market.
• The economy has a single consumption good and a capital good, and a non-renewable natural resource. The consumption of natural resource is determined after all taxes are paid. Each individual pays either taxes or receive subsidies for every unit of consumption of these resources.
• The government has the opportunity of allocating one unit of its tax revenues, collected from labor income plus energy taxes in the short-term investment (e.g. savings, mutual funds) at time t that gives a return ρ > 0 units of consumption good at t+1. At this point, this type of investment that is not consumed is liquidated. On the other hand, when the government allocates one unit of its tax revenues in a long-run investment (e.g. public goods, R&D, infrastructure), it will transform its tax revenues into producible capital at t+2 at the rate of return R. 4 If the long-run investment is liquidated at t+1, its "scrap value" is zero units. Thus,
we have a government that can make two types of investments: 1) in liquid assets; and 2) illiquid long-term assets.
• Once agents decide to be entrepreneurs, they use at time t, their net incomes (income after taxes) to make long-run savings or invest in assets such as stocks to receive a return R b > 0 at t+2 (at age-3) for every unit of net income saved/invested for two periods. An earlier withdrawing of savings will give an R b = 0. The government cannot without difficulty affect these agents' preferences on how to spend and distribute their incomes after paying taxes and consuming the natural resource that contributes to the generation of energy.
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• Defining c i as age i consumption, the utility function of all young agents is a CRRA type: 
where >-1, and is an individual-specific random variable that is realized at the beginning of age-2 (at t+1) and determines a saver's consumption preferences according to the following probability distribution: 0 1 1 with probability with probability
(1) and (2) indicate that young agents do not care to consume when they are young, i.e. at age-1 (at t). A proportion (1 -π) will retire early and consume at age-2. On the other side, a fraction of the individuals will only care about consuming at age-3 (i.e. = 1) and will rather choose to become entrepreneurs. By forgoing consumption at age-2 (t+1), they will be able to receive at age-3 (t+2): i) their returns in terms of producible capital (including better infrastructure and public goods) from paying their taxes to the government; and ii) their returns from investing their private savings.
• k t is the working capital that is held by an individual entrepreneur at t. We will have t k which represents the "average resources" (capital and financial assets) available to each entrepreneur at t. An entrepreneur who employs L t units of labor at t, paying each a real wage w t , produces the consumption good according to the following production function:
∈ (0 ,1), = 1 -. ( is distinguished from 1 -to emphasize that it represents an "external effect" in production. Capital is totally depreciated after one period.
Entrepreneurs' decisions and the labor market
Assuming the production function (3) and taking as given the real wage rate, the demand for labor that maximizes the representative entrepreneur's profits will be:
If we note that the condition for labor market equilibrium is L t = 1/ , after averaging (4) over firms and equating the result to 1/ , we find that the equilibrium real wage at t is:
(1 )
Given that the marginal value of the working capital is t k k -1 L 1-, the level of profits per entrepreneur,Φ, will be:
By using (4), (5) and (6), we can find the reduced form for profits per entrepreneur at t:
The government's public investment decisions
The government receives labor income taxes, Tw t , from the young generation which leaves them with a disposable income equal to ((1-T)w t ). A percentage e of this disposable income will be used for energy consumption, ((1-T)w t e), which will be also taxed by the government. This taxed energy consumption will be then (τ (1-T)w t e). If the government instead subsidize energy, individuals will received subsidies equal (-τ (1-T)w t e).
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For each unit of tax received, (t+τ(1-T)e), the government invests a proportion f t ∈[0,1] units in the short-run project; and a proportion n t ∈[0,1] units of it in the long-run project. Thus, each unit of tax is allocated as follows:
If an individual decides to retire from the labor force and consume at age-2 (at t+1), he/she receives r 1t units of the consumption good for each unit of tax paid at t to the government.
Individuals who claim the return for their paid taxes at age-3 (at t+2) and decide to be entrepreneurs to produce the consumption good, will receive a return r 2t of reproducible capital for each unit of tax paid at t to the government. The following constraints should be then satisfied:
(1-)r 1t = ρf t .
(9)
Constraint (9) says that the returns that the government obtains from its short-term investment ρf t ; should be enough to satisfy the total demand for consumption goods of middle-aged individuals (age-2) which is equal to (1-)r 1t , in exchange for the taxes paid when they were young. Thus, the returns from the government's investment decisions should be equal to the pledged returns (equal to (1-)r 1t ) to private individuals on each unit their paid taxes in terms of units of consumption goods. On the other hand, constraint (10) indicates that the returns that the government will obtain at t+2 from its long-run investment, Rn t , should be enough to satisfy the promised returns (equal to 2 k t r ) to the entrepreneurs on each unit of their paid taxes in terms of reproducible capital including infrastructure.
Note that agents will have a net income equal to (1 -T)(1 -e(1+τ))w t (i.e. after deducting energy consumption and paying income and fuel taxes) which they can save or invest in assets.
The problem of the government is to maximize the expected utility of the representative young taxpayer at time t, while anticipating that some middle-aged agents may retire early and the rest will become entrepreneurs. Taking into account the law of large numbers, the government will maximize the following expected utility of the representative tax-payer, evaluated at t: 
This expression follows from the fact that at t, all young agents (of age-1) pay their taxes, on their income and energy consumption. Also, a fraction 1-of agents (of age-2) are expected to retire from the labor force, demand their pensions prematurely, and has consumption only at age-2 (at t+1) equal to (1-T)(1-e(1+τ))w t + r 1t (Tw t + τ (1-T)w t e) (i.e. i.e. = 0) . A fraction are however expected to become entrepreneurs, instead of retiring early, and forgo consumption until they are of age-3, i.e. = 1. Each entrepreneur receives r 2t units of the reproducible capital good for every unit of tax paid. These entrepreneurs will consume i) their profits derived from their entrepreneurial activity equal to k t+2 (see equation (7)) , where, k t+2 = r 2t (Tw t + τ (1-T)w t e); plus ii) their returns on their savings or investments in assets equal to
We rewrite equation (11) taking into account the constraints (8), (9) and (10):
) . 
The government finds the optimal share of tax revenues to be invested in long-run projects, n t , by maximizing (12) with respect to n t , which is: (1+τ)) is the savings after taxes and energy expenses; (T+τ(1-T)e), and (1-t)e is energy consumption. Also notice in (13) that if
, then n t is independent of fuel taxes and is only determined by the parameters of the model (i.e. n t = C 1 /(C 1 +C 2 )).
Our most important results from equation (13):
Result 1. Higher fuel taxes will cause the government to allocate a larger proportion of the tax revenues into the long-run investment. This can be seen from the following expression:
Equation (14) however needs to be further explained as it shows that the sign of the impact of fuel taxes,τ, on the government's allocation of its tax revenues into the long-run investment, n t , might seem ambiguous (i.e., the sign of
The government will increase its long-run investments when energy taxes increase (∂n t /∂τ
This condition entails that:
• ρ < R. The return on short-term investment is smaller than the return to long-run investment.
This is important to give agents enough incentives to forgo early consumption;
• R b >1 which encourages agents to save or invest in the asset markets;
• θ, the output elasticity of capital, is large enough; and/or
• π, the probability of becoming an entrepreneur, is not extremely large.
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Result 2. For given fuel tax rate, if ρ increases (i.e. return to the short-run investment), the government will allocate a larger proportion of every unit of tax collected into the long-run investment, that is, in infrastructure and in public goods. The effect is stronger if there are robust preferences for avoiding inequality between generations in excess of what follows from the discounting in the utility function (i.e. γ is large in absolute terms). To achieve higher welfare, it is then optimal for the government to invest more in other sectors of the economy, including infrastructure and public goods when the return to non-renewable energy increases.
Result 3. For given fuel tax rate, too large increase in the return to long-run investment R, would not necessarily give more incentives to the government to make such investments. Thus, the government will not invest enough in infrastructure in spite of the higher returns. This can be viewed as a distortion as Jones (1998 Jones ( , 2013 described in the context of determining optimal research and development. Jones postulates that such type of distortion is a result of incomplete markets. In our case, there is a missing market for infrastructure and public goods which makes it difficult to identify the correct value (price) of the government's long-term investments. As a result, the government will not respond strongly enough to higher R.
It is now necessary to establish the conditions under which agents will have more incentives to forego consumption and become entrepreneurs. As we pointed out above, agents who withdraw at t+1 will consume r 1t
while agents who become entrepreneurs will consume {(1-T)(1-e)w t R b +
R(Tw t + τ(1 -T)w t e t )n t / ).
We find that agents with =1 will become entrepreneurs if the following condition holds:
or equivalently:
From (15) we obtain the following results:
Result 4. The larger the returns on the government's long-term investment, R, relatively to ρ, the greater the incentives to become entrepreneurs. There will be then sufficiently large return/gains on the government long-run investment in terms of reproducible capital. It is therefore crucial that the government translates tax revenues in its entirety into productive investment to succeed with its energy price reforms.
In summary, equation (15) indicates that any fuel price reforms, through elimination of subsidies, will be successful and induce higher production if the government guarantees high rates of return on its public productive investments. Otherwise fewer agents will choose to become entrepreneurs and many more will seek to retire early. In the latter case, the government will need to invest most of its tax revenues in short-term projects to fund the pensions of early retirees.
Equilibrium conditions
In equilibrium we have:
(1 )(1 (1 )) (
( (1 ) ) (1 )(1 (1 )) . 
Equation (16) indicates that at equilibrium the average resource level (working capital plus financial assets) at t+2, 2 t k + , depends on the returns on the government's long-run investments, (R); how much of each unit of tax the government allocates into long-run investments such as infrastructure and public goods (n t ); the probability that individuals will become entrepreneurs, π; income taxes t; fuel taxes on energy consumption τ, the fraction of consumption that goes into energy consumption, e; the output elasticity of capital, θ; real wages (w t ) and ultimately the return to entrepreneurs' private savings, R b . Particularly, note that at t+2, 2 , t k + depends on taxes (in addition to the other mentioned variables) paid at t which is reasonable since capital formation is assumed to take two periods.
Inserting (5) into (16) and dividing it by t k yields:
Under our assumed production function (equation (3)), and taking into consideration the optimal levels of employment (equation (4)) and real wage (equation (5)) that clears the labor market, the output per firm at time t at equilibrium equals to
. Since the number of firms is constant over time, equation (17) The conclusion is that an economy cannot exclusively rely on public investment financed with tax revenues to attain positive growth. But high subsidies (-τ) on the other hand, will have a negative effect on growth because the government will not have enough funds to invest long-run investments (including public investment) in reproducible capital for the use of the 8 τ becomes less negative. 9 An extreme but unlikely case will be one in which fuel taxes are extremely high that causes a negative growth (i.e.
negative g t+2 yielding 2 / t t k k
entrepreneurs. In such circumstances, most agents will retire early and very few will become entrepreneurs.
We now address the following question: how will a reduction in fuel subsidies or an increase in fuel taxes affect g t+2 , for given initial levels of subsidies or taxes, respectively?
We consider n t , as determined by (13). We note that the rate of return on savings (R b ) is smaller than the pledged return to the entrepreneurs for each unit of their tax paid to the government (r 2t ) to have incentives to become entrepreneur; and that tax revenues, (tw t + τ(1 -T)w t e t ), are always positive. We obtain the following result:
Result 6. For given parameter values, a reduction in fuel subsidies (i.e. a less negative τ) will increase the rate of economic growth. This effect on the growth rate will be greater the higher is the initial level of fuel subsidies. On the other hand, higher fuel taxes (i.e. a higher positive τ)
will also raise the growth rate. It is nonetheless important to note that if the existing level of fuel taxes is already very high, the effect of higher fuel taxes on growth will be minimal. Thus, such an economy will experience decreasing returns as its fuel taxes, τ, start increasing and if its taxes are already too high. This result can be examined in the following expression:
By taking the second derivative to (18), we can determine whether the equilibrium rate of
, is a concave or convex function with respect to fuel taxes, τ. Indeed, we find that this growth rate with respect to τ is concave:
This second derivative will be more negative, the smaller the fuel subsidies, τ, is. Results 5 and 6
are illustrated in Figure 5 . 10 Keep in mind that r 2t = Rn t /π. Figure 5 shows a concave curve G illustrating GDP growth as a function of the fuel retail price in a particular country. When a country has initially too low energy prices relative to certain fuel reference price such as P, as a result of energy subsidies or too low taxes (as for many MENA countries), our endogenous growth model predicts that the country will experience higher GDP growth as the energy price level rises (Result 6, equation (18)). Such effect is greater, the larger the initially level of subsidies. This would suggest moving from point L to point H on the curve for GDP growth (G).
However, our model also predicts that if the country has already higher energy prices relative to some fuel reference price and continues increasing the fuel retail price, to for example P*, this country will face diminishing returns with respect to fuel taxes. This is probably the case of many ECA countries. The country will be moving to the right of H at U on curve G. This will occur because, according to the growth model, setting too high fuel taxes will induce a substantial decline in private savings and this economy will experience lower, or even negative rates of economic growth. To achieve economic growth, an economy should have an appropriate balance between public investment financed from tax revenues and private savings to avoid the diminishing returns to too high fuel taxes (Result 6, equation (17)).
Figure 4
GDP (1998 -2004) and (2005 -2012) . This econometric approach requires that we obtain, for each country, the mean value of the relevant variables for each of the periods of study.
2. A panel approach to study short-and medium-run effects. This analysis will quantify both the contemporaneous and the two-year-lagged effect of the fuel price gap on economic growth. The analysis here will be done by World Bank Region at the annual basis. Understanding the short-term impacts of fuel price reforms is also important because it is often how reforms affect the welfare of low income households in the first periods that determine their survival politically.
These two approaches are therefore not only technically different, but each of them gives us different perspectives on the relationship between energy subsidies and economic growth.
The analysis considers relationships between GDP per capita growth on one hand, and the price gap as defined by Koplow's (2009 
Cross-Sectional Modeling
The cross-sectional approach uses the following simple empirical relation which represents our theoretical result represented by equation (17) I i,1998 represents the initial income for each country in 1998, which serves to quantify the differences in the effect of subsidies on the economic growth across countries.
One will fail to reject the main Hypothesis if β 1c is positive and statistically significant in the empirical relationship (20a). The coefficient ϕ 1c accompanying the square of the differences in prices is expected to be negative, in which case diminishing returns to increasing fuel prices will be at work. Such expected empirical results are also predicted by our endogenous growth model .
That is, for a country whose energy prices are initially low, one should expect there to be much to gain in terms of additional growth by increasing energy prices. However, as an economy has fuel prices reaching higher levels, the gains in economic growth are reduced (Result 6).
Panel Estimations Modeling
This approach allows an analysis by Bank Region. Equation (3a) is modified as follows: Regions at year t. Time and country fixed effects are denoted by τ t and c i , respectively. it is the error term. Statistically positive and significant β 2p and β 3p indicate that a country will experience an increase in its current GDP per capita growth by β 2p % and β 3p % if it had pursued fuel price reforms by increasing its fuel retail price by 1 cent relative to a specific fuel reference price (i.e. ∆price gap = 1 cent), during each of the past two years, respectively. There will be in addition a change of β 1p % in the current GDP per capita growth if there is also an increase of 1 cent in the current price gap. A negative β 1p should not however lead to reject our underlying Hypothesis, if β 2p and/or β 3p are above all positive. Such result would only indicate that fuel price reforms do not have contemporaneous positive effects on output, but need to work their way through the economic system over time and it should not necessarily lead to a rejection of our underlying Hypothesis.
On the other hand, a significant positive/negative ϕ 1p and ϕ 2p would indicate increasing/diminishing returns, in terms of growth, to increasing energy prices in the previous and current period. This is again also predicted by our theoretical model. Accordingly, one should expect the lagged effects (of the last past one-or two-year fuel price gaps), and the contemporaneous effects (of current fuel price gaps) on contemporaneous GDP growth, to differ. Increases in fuel retail prices today will likely increase fuel costs for enterprises which could lead to abrupt adjustments in their production, investment and employment, which can be manifested in an immediate reduction in growth, that is the same year the fuel subsidy reforms are implemented (with possible exceptions in cases where these fuel increases are compensated contemporaneously via increased money transfers to the public). This will be echoed with a negative value of β 1p . Nonetheless, with time, a country that puts in practice enduring fuel price reforms will likely encounter positive effects on its economy in the following periods. Such effect will be reflected in positive values of β 2p and/or β 3p . The GDP per capita in such reforming countries could start rising in the following periods via a number of different "pathways" stimulated by the lasting fuel price increases (lower budget deficits, larger social and infrastructure investment), while enterprises adjust their businesses to the new fuel pricing.
Estimation Method
We use the (robust) OLS estimation method for the cross-sectional data, and the System General Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano-Bover (1995)/Blundell-Bond (1998)) for the panel data. The GMM corrects for possible endogeneity and non-stationarity of the regressors or explanatory variables. In particular, diesel and gasoline prices are most likely to be endogenous, being affected by both demand and supply conditions.
The tables below report both the two-step estimates (which yield theoretically robust results, Roodman (2009) 
Estimation Results

Cross-Sectional Analysis on the effect of energy subsidies on GDP per capita growth across all countries excluding High-Income OECD countries
We here present the (robust) OLS estimates of equation (21a). Selected relevant estimates are displayed in Table 1 and has resulted in greater damage in terms of reduced economic growth from energy subsidies.
Thus, a decrease in subsidies must have helped to achieve increased rates of economic growth over this period. This would also appear much less likely to have been the case before 2005. From observing these contrasting facts, it becomes obvious that one needs to analyze these patterns by Region, and quantify the impact of fuel prices on the economic growth on the Regional basis. Such differentiation cannot be done by using the Cross-Sectional Approach. 
Panel Country Analysis of effects of energy subsidies on GDP per capita growth per World Bank Region
We One should recognize that increases in fuel retail prices today will likely increase fuel costs for enterprises which could lead to abrupt short-run adjustments in their production, investment and employment. This can be manifested in a reduction in growth in the same year that fuel subsidy reforms are implemented. This will be echoed with a negative value of β 1p in equation (20b). Nonetheless, any fuel price reform made today will be beneficial in the subsequent periods. The GDP per capita in reforming countries could start rising in the following periods via a number of different "pathways" stimulated by the positive effects that these reforms have on government budget and social and infrastructure investment. In the meantime, enterprises gradually adjust their businesses to the more "correct" and new fuel price levels and their positive effects on its economy in the following periods. Such effect will be reflected in positive values of β 2p and/or β 3p from equation (20b).
Indeed, the estimated parameters β 2p and β 3p (parameters of the RHS variables (price gap) t-1 and (price gap) t-2 , respectively) in equation (20b) are statistically significant and positive. These results then indicate that the benefits of decreasing fuel (diesel or gasoline) subsidies today will be noticed in each of the next couple of years, respectively. Thus, a subsidy reduction in t-1 or t-2 will cause an increase in GDP per capita growth in period t in all World Bank Regions except in countries of the ECA Region and OECD for both diesel and gasoline, and the LAC and AFR Regions for gasoline.
Note that the GDP per capita growth in countries of certain Regions could rise concurrently (i.e. at t) with reductions in fuel subsidies (also at t). This would be the case when β 1p (which accompanies the RHS variable (price gap) t ) is positive and statistically significant. This is especially notable for MENA (only diesel), LAC, and AFR. It is however found that only countries in the EAP Regions (and ECA and OECD) might need to cope with contemporaneous (i.e. at t) reductions in their GDP per capita growth in response to increases in domestic retail diesel price (i.e. also occurring at t).
A significant positive (negative) ϕ 1p and ϕ 2p (parameters accompanying the square of the fuel price gaps at t and t-1, respectively) would indicate increasing (diminishing) returns, in terms of growth, to increasing energy prices not only in the same year when the fuel price reform took place, but also in the subsequent year. This is the case of countries in most Regions: they face diminishing returns in terms of growth as they increase their fuel prices. This result corresponds to the reasoning behind the inverted U-form curve G in Figure 5 and our endogenous growth model.
Referring again to Figure 5 , one can say that most of the countries in all World Bank Regions seem to be on the left-rising (upward-sloping) part of the curve G in section 2 above.
Interestingly, for the ECA Region (and OECD countries) results are directly opposite in response to increases in these countries' fuel prices, which indicates that lower fuel prices and taxes would, in general, lead to higher economic growth in this particular region. b Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals • There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals d With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions b Standard errors in parentheses.*** Significant at the 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals • There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals d With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions : Pr > chi2 = 1.00 a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. b Standard errors in parentheses.***Significant at 1% level;**significant at 5% level;*significant at 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals A recent World Bank (2014) report emphasizes that energy subsidies encourage energyintensive production, which also tends to be capital-intensive, and discourages labor employment. If the MENA countries substantially reduce their levels of energy subsidies, their levels of employment will increase, in particular among the young.
7. Will savings from reducing fuel subsidy expenditures be relocated to productive public investment and spur economic growth?
As Figure 3 above indicates, a disproportionate amount of resources are used to finance subsidies in the MENA Region relative to those used in public investment. It is of relevance to learn whether any savings in fuel subsidies made by the MENA Countries have been (and could be) redirected toward more productive public investment. On the other hand, to assess whether or not fiscal budgets improve in response to reduced fuel subsidies in the MENA countries, we need to determine how government investment in public goods such as health, education and infrastructure, respond to reductions in fuel subsidies.
Due to data restrictions, the focus here is only on infrastructure, health and education. For comparison purposes, the analysis also include the countries in the ECA Region. The figures give a strong indication that these countries redirect at least part of their subsidy savings to health. This is also shown empirically. We estimate the following relationship:
X it is a matrix containing variables related to Education, Health, and Infrastructure for each country at time t. The other explanatory variables have been defined above. ξ it is the error term.
Due to availability of data, we only consider public education expenditures as a percentage of GDP; and the ratio of the number of students enrolled to pursue a tertiary education as a proportion of the population of the same age group that officially corresponds to the level of education; infrastructure expenditures relative to GDP; the percentages of rural populations that have access to water; and the percentage of rural population that have access to sanitation.
Much of the government savings due to reduced gasoline and diesel subsidies have been
used to increase spending in health in the MENA countries. An increase in the price of diesel or gasoline of 20 cents per liter for two consecutive years can lead to an increase in health expenditures of 0.24 percent of GDP. See Table 5 .
It is however evident from Table 5 that subsidy savings have not been enough to sustain higher health expenditures for long periods into the future. This is also confirmed by Figure 5 .
The governments might need other funding sources as well as a longer-lasting reduction in fuel subsidies to sustain permanent increases in health expenditure. This is reasonable since adjustments in the personnel and infrastructure would need continuously more funding to have a positive impact on the health sector. For comparison purposes, we also present the empirical results for the ECA countries which indicate that these countries consistently use their fuel tax revenues to maintain higher health expenditures over longer periods of time. : Pr > chi2 = 1.00 a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals • There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals d With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions Investments in infrastructure have been delayed from the time the governments obtain savings from reduced diesel subsidies. This can be seen from Table 6 . 12 We find that in the MENA countries, it takes at least one year to observe a positive and statistically significant reallocating of subsidy savings toward infrastructure investments. This is much in contrast to the ECA countries, which seem to not only immediately redirect a larger proportion of their fuel taxes to infrastructure investments, but also allocate more permanent such taxes into future investments. (21) are not significant and may even be negative. The MENA countries need to make the reductions in fuel subsidies substantial and permanent to obtain more steady revenues.
The countries in the ECA Region seem to have contrasting practices. They benefit more from their more persistent fuel tax policies practices. These allow them to experience more longterm positive effects and boosting their aggregate demand through the short-run fiscal multiplier, crowding in private investment and benefitting from the highly complementary nature of infrastructure services. Table 7 shows how savings in diesel subsidies can be redirected toward education expenditures. For instance, today's education spending will increase around 0.27 percent of GDP if a government saves today 20 cents per liter in diesel subsidies. However, savings from reducing or eliminating fuel subsidies in a specific year t only serve to finance education expenditures the same concurrent year and not beyond that year. For the ECA countries in contrast, the same amount of forgone subsidies are used for at least three consecutive future years to finance public education.
With regard to enrollment in tertiary education, there will be more incentives to pursue higher education in response to higher fuel prices in countries of both Regions. The enrollment increases by about 2.8 percent in response to a 20 cents increase in retail diesel price. Thus, higher fuel prices might make individuals aware that they need more education to i) increase their likelihood to participate in the labor force and be able to finance their fuel consumption; 13 We have also considered urban populations and the results are available upon request.
and/or ii) respond to a demand for specific skilled labor as their countries' production structure changes in response to reduced subsidies. Note also here the contrasting situation between the MENA and ECA countries. : Pr > chi2 = 1.00 a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at 1% level; **significant at 5% level; *significant at 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
• There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals • There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals d With the Sargan statistics, one can test the null hypothesis of correct model specification and valid overidentifying restrictions
Will reductions in fuel price subsidies ameliorate government budget balance?
There is a general perspective that fuel subsidies could cause government budget deficits. A reduction or elimination in subsidies should then reduce deficits, unless the government uses the entire savings from subsidies on productive public investments, or to grant cash transfers to the public to compensate them for any loss in welfare caused by higher fuel prices. : Pr > chi2 = 1.00 a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. b Standard errors in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level; **significant at the 5% level; *significant at the 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
The channels by which fuel price reforms stimulate economic growth in MENA countries
We have demonstrated that i) a reduction in subsidies is likely to spur economic growth; and ii)
in MENA region countries a fraction of government savings from reduced energy subsidies are redirected toward public expenditures such as health, education and infrastructure. The obvious next step is to explore and disentangle whether each of these types of public investments are channels by which energy subsidies affect economic growth in this region.
Education expenditures is a main contributor to explaining economic growth, from relevant economic literature. 14 Table 9 presents the interaction between education, fuel subsidies (Koplow's fuel price gap) and economic growth. From this analysis we will also learn if the fuel subsidies -economic growth relationship is robust to the alternative we here propose.
The following empirical relationship is estimated using a panel analysis:
The other important result is to notice that now there are no effects of diesel and gasoline subsidies on GDP per capita in our new specification. That indicates that any effect that a reduction in subsidies can have on GDP per capita must has occurred through increases in the different public investments, especially in education. a A positive price gap implies a tax on this fuel; a negative price gap implies a subsidy. b Standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *significant at 10% level c These are the Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first differences. There, the corresponding null hypotheses (H 0 ) are respectively:
Conclusions
To fully understand why and how a country can gain from eliminating fuel subsidies, it requires a thorough analysis involving various fields including economics, politics, and life sciences, to mention just a few, as well as a deep understanding of human behavior and the government's role in the lives of its citizens.
Our objective and approach have been here more modest, and has aimed to promote an awareness of potential benefits of phasing out fuel subsidies. This paper has studied the : Pr > chi2 = 1.00 relationships between fuel pricing and economic growth, and mechanisms by which removing fuel subsidies or imposing fuel taxes can spur growth.
One of the purposes of this paper has been to study relationships between fuel pricing and economic growth, and to investigate the mechanisms by which the removal of fuel subsidies, or imposing fuel taxes, can spur growth. We first present a theoretical analysis in which young agents derive their incomes from supplying labor, and pay income and fuel taxes. The government can invest such fuel tax revenues in short-term projects, or in long-term productive projects in productive capital (including infrastructure) and generate positive externalities. When agents become middle-aged, a certain proportion of them will choose to spend their net income right away, and retire early from the labor force and collect their pensions which is financed with the government's short-term investments. The rest of the individuals prefer to become entrepreneurs and use the productive capital stock derived from the government's investments.
We first demonstrate that higher economic growth is possible if government revenues from reduced fuel subsidies, or increased fuel taxes, are used less in short-term investment, and more for long-term investments (e.g. in public goods, infrastructure, producible capital) that yield high returns. Such a type of decisions give agents incentives to become entrepreneurs and be productive instead of retiring early and become just consumers. At least two important lessons can be drawn from our model. First, we have identified a plausible mechanism by which higher fuel subsidies will lead to lower economic growth. Second, it is important that the government spends its revenues from increasing fuel taxes to expand the economy's productive capital (e.g.
infrastructure. This is a useful result that can serve as a basis for guidelines to governments.
We then go on to empirically test our hypothesis, derived from our theoretical model. This is, a country that initially subsidizes its fuels, and implements a reform to eliminate or reduce these subsidies, will experience higher economic GDP growth. We also test if there are diminishing returns in terms of increased growth if fuel prices rise too much as our model predicts.
The results confirm these hypotheses both from analyzing jointly all countries of all the World Bank Regions (cross-sectional analysis); but also the countries individually for each of the World Bank Regions (panel analysis).
Taxing fuels, or reducing fuel subsidies, will lead to higher rates of GDP per capita growth, especially for countries with high initial fuel subsidies, such as for most of the countries in the MENA region. Thus, countries that subsidize or under-tax diesel and gasoline are the most likely candidates to reap economic gains by subsidizing these fuels less and/or taxing them more; and thus gain the most by growing at higher rates. On the other hand, countries which at the outset have relatively high taxes on their fuels, such as most of the ECA and OECD countries, have somewhat less to gain from further fuel price increases; growth rates might here in fact decrease.
The channels by which reduced energy subsidies, or the imposition of energy taxes, may increase economic growth are also analyzed. It is found, in particular, that reduced fuel subsidies at a given current period in the MENA region increase not only to contemporaneous but also future expenditures on health, education, and public infrastructure investments.
Note however that in the case of the MENA countries, subsidy savings might not sustain higher health, education and infrastructure expenditures for long periods into the future. The governments in MENA countries might need to make more long-lasting reductions in fuel subsidies to finance permanently and stable health expenditures. In contrast, governments in the ECA countries seem to consistently smooth their use of their high fuel taxes to sustain public goods expenditures over time.
As a consequence of these large responses of public goods expenditures to subsidy savings, the governments in MENA will not obviously experience much improvement in their government budget deficits immediately following a fuel price reform. Such improvements appear to be achieved, according to our empirical results, only with a two-year lag.
Our final important empirical result is a significant positive effect of subsidy savings on employment and labor force participation in the MENA countries. Such effects are particularly strong when diesel subsidies are phased out. We found that raising diesel taxes might reduce labor participation in the very short run (as subsidies are removed), including the youth population aged 15 to 24 in the MENA countries. But as the economy adjusts and reallocates resources in response to the new energy prices, and with the help of better infrastructure and better supply of public services (which is what we find and presented below), labor market participation and employment increase substantially in subsequent years.
